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NODE/03 · Term

TON Proxy

Networking layer of TON that routes traffic to ton-sites and the regular web through ADNL-based relays. Designed as a censorship-resistant, Tor-like overlay built into the ecosystem.

Aliases: ton proxy, censorship-resistant proxy

TON Proxy is the networking component of TON’s web stack. It runs on top of ADNL and lets a client reach resources inside the TON network (most importantly ton-sites) and, optionally, regular HTTPS websites via a chain of relays. The original Telegram Open Network whitepaper framed it as a built-in alternative to Tor — anonymity and censorship resistance integrated with the rest of the protocol.

Why it exists

Two motivations drove the design:

  1. Reach ton-sites without depending on the legacy DNS/IP fabric. Resources are addressed by ADNL identifiers; a single blocked IP does not take a service down because the client can discover other nodes through the DHT.
  2. Provide privacy for any traffic that opts in. Multi-hop relays hide the originator from the destination and the destination URL from the user’s ISP.

Components

  • Client — local agent (CLI, browser extension, or wallet-integrated feature) that exposes a SOCKS/HTTP proxy on the user’s machine.
  • Relay nodes — public nodes that forward traffic. Many of these run alongside validators or full nodes that opt into providing the service.
  • Gateways — relays with a route into the regular internet; they accept ADNL traffic and bridge it to public HTTPS endpoints, similar in spirit to Tor exit nodes.

Typical flows

  • Browsing a ton-site. The local proxy resolves a .ton name through TON DNS, fetches the site bundle from TON Storage, and serves it to the browser as if it were any normal HTTPS page.
  • Browsing the regular web through TON Proxy. Traffic is wrapped in ADNL, hops through relays, and exits via a gateway. The user’s ISP sees only the connection to the entry relay; the destination sees only the gateway IP.
  • Anonymous P2P apps. Any application that speaks ADNL can use TON Proxy as a privacy layer without inventing its own anonymity network.

Realistic expectations

As of 2025–2026, TON Proxy is closer to an experimental part of the stack than a mass-market privacy tool. Practical caveats:

  • Latency. Multi-hop routing adds delay, just as it does for Tor; streaming and large downloads suffer.
  • Network size. Anonymity quality depends on the number of independent relays and gateways. The TON relay network is smaller than Tor today.
  • Exit-node legalities. Operating gateways carries jurisdictional considerations comparable to running Tor exit relays.

Place in the stack

TON Proxy works hand-in-hand with TON DNS (naming), TON Sites (content format), and TON Storage (hosting). Used alone, each component delivers only part of the value; used together, they form a self-contained “decentralised web” that does not rely on traditional ICANN/CA/CDN infrastructure.

Related terms