TON Proxy
Networking layer of TON that routes traffic to ton-sites and the regular web through ADNL-based relays. Designed as a censorship-resistant, Tor-like overlay built into the ecosystem.
Aliases: ton proxy, censorship-resistant proxy
TON Proxy is the networking component of TON’s web stack. It runs on top of ADNL and lets a client reach resources inside the TON network (most importantly ton-sites) and, optionally, regular HTTPS websites via a chain of relays. The original Telegram Open Network whitepaper framed it as a built-in alternative to Tor — anonymity and censorship resistance integrated with the rest of the protocol.
Why it exists
Two motivations drove the design:
- Reach ton-sites without depending on the legacy DNS/IP fabric. Resources are addressed by ADNL identifiers; a single blocked IP does not take a service down because the client can discover other nodes through the DHT.
- Provide privacy for any traffic that opts in. Multi-hop relays hide the originator from the destination and the destination URL from the user’s ISP.
Components
- Client — local agent (CLI, browser extension, or wallet-integrated feature) that exposes a SOCKS/HTTP proxy on the user’s machine.
- Relay nodes — public nodes that forward traffic. Many of these run alongside validators or full nodes that opt into providing the service.
- Gateways — relays with a route into the regular internet; they accept ADNL traffic and bridge it to public HTTPS endpoints, similar in spirit to Tor exit nodes.
Typical flows
- Browsing a ton-site. The local proxy resolves a
.tonname through TON DNS, fetches the site bundle from TON Storage, and serves it to the browser as if it were any normal HTTPS page. - Browsing the regular web through TON Proxy. Traffic is wrapped in ADNL, hops through relays, and exits via a gateway. The user’s ISP sees only the connection to the entry relay; the destination sees only the gateway IP.
- Anonymous P2P apps. Any application that speaks ADNL can use TON Proxy as a privacy layer without inventing its own anonymity network.
Realistic expectations
As of 2025–2026, TON Proxy is closer to an experimental part of the stack than a mass-market privacy tool. Practical caveats:
- Latency. Multi-hop routing adds delay, just as it does for Tor; streaming and large downloads suffer.
- Network size. Anonymity quality depends on the number of independent relays and gateways. The TON relay network is smaller than Tor today.
- Exit-node legalities. Operating gateways carries jurisdictional considerations comparable to running Tor exit relays.
Place in the stack
TON Proxy works hand-in-hand with TON DNS (naming), TON Sites (content format), and TON Storage (hosting). Used alone, each component delivers only part of the value; used together, they form a self-contained “decentralised web” that does not rely on traditional ICANN/CA/CDN infrastructure.